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The purpose of this article is to offer analysis of the passage on evil in the Theaetetus 176a4-8. I submit 
that it stands in an anticipatory relation to Plato’s mature theory of evil, as it can be deduced from the 
Timaeus and the Politicus. My claim is that in the Theaetetus passage two contrary principles are 
postulated, one of which is the cause of good, while the other is the cause of evil. To support that claim, I 
shall argue that a) Plato’s doctrine of the Forms is present in the Theaetetus Digression; b) the word 
‘good’ at 176a6 refers to Plato’s highest entity – αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν; c) τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified 
with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν mentioned in the same line; d) the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated 
opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage (176a8) could denote the same entity, i.e. 
the Timaean Necessity.  
 
 
1. Setting the Scene: the Theaetetus Digression 
 
The most important text for the investigation of the Platonic origin of evil are the 
cosmological account of the Timaeus, the ‘great tale’ (μέγας μῦθος, 268d9) of the Politicus, as 
well as the Laws X passage on the ontological and causal priority of ψυχή, and on the allegedly 
bad, irrational cosmic soul operational in the cosmos (896c-898c). Still, there are several other 
passages pertinent to the problem, unsystematically dispersed through Plato’s numerous writings. 
Such a short, but rather interesting textual snippet is Theaetetus 176a-b, and especially the two 
clauses at 176a5-8. In this article I shall try to offer some reflections on the passage and clarify 
its purport, with the intention to emphasize its eminence in the frame of Plato’s thoughts on the 
origin of evil. If the following interpretation has some claim to plausibility, then we are dealing 
with a text which stands in a programmatic or at least anticipatory connection to the later 
developments on the issue.    
The passage in question is to be found midway through the Theaetetus, in the part which 
Socrates himself closes by pronouncing it a digression from the main flow of the argument 
(177b8). The famous Digression appears in the course of Socrates’ presentation and refutation of 
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 the thesis that Knowledge is sense perception (151d-186e). Its immediate context is the 
restatement and rebuttal of the staged defense of Protagoras’ homo mensura doctrine, as 
extended not only to perception, but also to judgments (165e-168c), or more specifically the 
argument starting with the generally accepted premise that some men are wiser than others, at 
least in “[t]he matter of what is expedient because it will bring future benefits”1 (169d-172b). 
Even a Protagorean must accept that, although most things are the way they seem to the 
individual, there are still some which require an expert’s opinion, i.e. which are objectively better 
known or performed by some people, whom, furthermore, the rest of the population recognizes 
as experts and prefers as agents in the given cases. Two pairs of judgments are being compared: 
those concerning sensations versus those concerning soundness of body, and those concerning 
values versus those concerning social wellbeing. Thus, while the relativity of the degree of 
saltiness of a broth may be safely maintained, matters of health require objective opinion of an 
expert physician. Again, while no citizen (or state) is wiser than another in judgment of things 
commendable, just, or pious, decisions concerning matters of general advantage or disadvantage 
for the state are readily delegated to the most capable, and the objectivity of their success or 
failure is easily observable.2 
Next Socrates briefly introduces yet another class of men: those who are even greater 
Protagoreans than Protagoras, due to their adherence to the doctrine of extreme relativism in the 
field of value judgments. Opinions on what is right, wrong or pious, unlike those concerning 
sense data, have no standing in nature, but are purely a matter of social convention (172b2-c1).3 
This is certainly not an understanding in any way appealing to Plato; he wants to maintain that 
the commendable, the just, the pious are absolute values. However, a discussion in the direction 
of establishing such a position would overtake the interlocutors with a greater argument arising 
from a smaller one (172b9-c1), and therefore it cannot be pursued there and then. So, Plato uses 
                                                          
1 Guthrie, William Keith Chambers. A History of Greek Philosophy V: The Later Plato and the Academy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978), p. 88  
2 This argument precedes the final refutation of the defense of Protagoras (177c-177d), which simply 
elaborates on the point already made: ‘man the measure’ doctrine cannot stand since there are people, 
including Protagoras himself, who sincerely believe that they know what is better for the rest of the 
people to do in the future, as well as that they – on the basis of their superior knowledge – are able to 
predict more accurately future events and states of affairs.  
3 Cornford, Francis MacDonald. Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and 
Co. Ltd. 1935), pp. 82f 
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 the Digression mainly as an indirect argument against the relativity of moral values.4 But there is 
much more to it. A perfectly Platonic consequence of the attempt to ascribe objective value to 
justice or piety is the stealthy introduction of the theory of Forms,5 seemingly irrelevant to the 
dialogue’s argumentative strategy and incompatible with its aporetic end. Two other quite 
striking points are the brief exposition of the nature of evil (176a5-8), and the most direct 
formulation of Plato’s far-reaching exhortation to become like god as far as it is possible (176b1-
2), this being the path leading to human happiness and perfection.         
At the beginning of the Digression Socrates pauses for a while in his evaluation and 
criticism of Protagoras’ ideas and makes a comparison between a philosopher devoted to 
intellectual pursuits, and a practical man frequenting the law-courts (172c3-176a2). The former, 
although socially awkward, rightly enjoys the privilege of being called a free man. He has σχολή 
for pursuit of any argument he likes for as much time as he likes, and his exertions are not aimed 
at merely satisfying the bare necessities of life, but at investigating the things as they are, 
especially the lofty concepts of justice, happiness and the like. The latter, on the other hand, is 
well adapted to society, but has a slavish mentality and misses the true purpose of human life by 
focusing on the petty particulars of every day’s pleasure and pain. His subjects of choice are 
mostly discourses concerning the prosecution or defense of some other slave. A flatterer aiming 
at the pleasure of the jurymen and at the rebuttal of the opponent whose patience is very limited, 
he is being constantly pressed by time. This comparison brings to mind the contrast drawn in the 
Gorgias between the rhetor and the philosopher,6 but its main purpose is to declare clearly the 
distinction between the objects of their interest – the philosopher’s being stable and admirable, 
the practical man’s transitory and useless. These, as will become obvious from the rest of the 
Digression, are equivalent to Plato’s two orders of reality – Being and Becoming. Theodorus the 
geometrician, one of Socrates’ interlocutors in the dialogue, agrees wholeheartedly with what has 
                                                          
4 “Plato offers no formal refutation of these claims, but it would seem that the main point of the digression 
is to make it clear that he sharply disagrees”. (Bostock, David. Plato’s Theaetetus (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1988), p. 98). 
5 How else should a Platonist argue that goodness, justice, piety, etc., exist by nature, and not by 
convention only? 
6 Socrates’ description of the philosopher’s clumsy behavior in a house of law at 174c is reminiscent of 
Callicles’ fair warning that if unjustly charged, Socrates would have no use of himself as a defender 
against the accusations (Gorg. 486a). It may thus serve as an allusion to his imminent end. The Socrates 
of the Theaetetus is, after all, bound to the stoa of the King Archon, to meet Meletus’ accusation (210d).   
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 been said, and expresses his belief that, were everyone convinced of the importance of the 
philosophical investigations, this world would be infested with far less evil than it presently is. 
On that notice, Socrates utters the sentences which are of crucial importance for us here, and to 
which we shall return shortly:7 “But it is not possible, Theodorus, that evil should be destroyed – 
for there must always be something opposed to the good: nor it is possible that it should have its 
seat in heaven. But it must inevitably haunt human life, and prowl about this earth.”8 Next we 
learn that the only way to shun evil is to fly away from this place to the higher region, a task 
which can be accomplished only by becoming as similar to god as possible: φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις 
θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν (176b1-2). He being the ultimate paradigm of goodness, the task of 
emulating god is accomplished by perfecting one’s moral character. According to the very well-
known Socratic tenet, virtuous life is possible only for those who have acquired wisdom, and 
here moral perfection is exemplified through the acquisition of two of the five cardinal virtues, 
namely through becoming just and pious, by means of wisdom: ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον 
μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι (176b2-3). Plato’s motivation behind the choice of these two 
particular virtues is quite clear – they were already mentioned at 172b3 as examples of values 
that were, according to both Protagoras and those who do not accept Protagoras’ teaching in all 
respect (172b6-7), subjective and relative. Thus the rest of the Digression (176b-177c) is 
dedicated to drawing a clear distinction between civic and philosophical understanding of 
justice,9 the former depending on conventions underlying human interaction, the latter on 
wisdom and μίμησις of the perfect paradigm, divine and supremely happy. Civic justice turns out 
to be nothing else but ignorance and wickedness (176c6), resulting in unholy life on earth and 
denial of access to the pure realm after death, while philosophic justice is just the opposite, both 
in substance and results. Real justice is thus an absolute value after all, since it is firmly 
                                                          
7 The very fact that Theodorus’ rather general statement receives such an energetic and specific response 
may be an indication of Plato’s hopes that his readers’ curiosity would now be further stimulated; and that 
is good and desirable, because he has something very important to say, although he is saying it in only a 
few words. The austerity of the expression, however, must not fool us: “What is being said in a Platonic 
dialogue must be watched most carefully: every word counts; some casually spoken words may be more 
important than lengthy, elaborate statements” (Klein, Jacob. Plato’s Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist and 
the Statesman (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1977), p. 2).   
8 Tht. 176a4-8, as translated by Levett, with Burnyeat’s revision (Burnyeat, Myles Fredric. The 
Theaetetus of Plato, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1990), p. 304).    
9 Piety is completely dropped out of the picture. For possible reasons, see Sedley, David. The Midwife of 
Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato’s Theaeteus (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2004), pp. 82ff.  
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 grounded on and dependent upon the divine paradigm and safeguarded by god himself, who is in 
no way whatsoever unjust: θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος (176b8-c1). The impression of 
relativity of justice “[a]rises from the narrow perspective that is enforced if one concentrates on 
issues of justice and injustice within the city – in the law courts, the assembly, the council.”10   
     
2. Is Plato’s theory of Forms present in the Theaetetus? 
 
It is interesting to note that none of the (relatively) recent Theaetetus scholars pays much 
heed to the mention of evil at 176a-b and its implications on Plato’s overall view on the subject. 
Kennedy (1881), Taylor (1926), Cornford (1935), McDowell (1973), Bostock (1988), Burnyeat 
(1990), Chappell (2004) and Tschemplik (2008), in their commentaries and notes, basically pass 
over the passage on evil silently, or dedicate only few words to it.11 That is, however, a rather 
easily understandable omission. All these authors are, naturally, predominantly focused on the 
epistemological import of the Theaetetus, ‘What is knowledge?’ being the main question of the 
dialogue. They do indeed treat carefully the issue of relativity of justice and the possibility of 
reading the theory of Forms in the Digression, but these as well are all too closely connected 
with the epistemological pursuit of the dialogue. If Socrates, albeit indirectly, indeed introduces 
the Forms in the Digression (and elsewhere in the dialogue), then Cornford might have been 
right in claiming that the main lesson to be learned from the Theaetetus was that no plausible 
account of knowledge was possible if they were left aside.12 But one need not go that far; as a 
                                                          
10 Sedley 2004, p. 65 
11 One exception is Stern, Paul. “The Philosophical Importance of Political Life: On the ‘Digression’ in 
Plato’s ‘Theaetetus’” (The American Political Science Review, 96. 2. 2002), to some of whose comments 
I shall turn later. Another one is Guthrie (1978), who dedicates a somewhat lengthy excursus to the 
problem of evil. In it, however, he does not interpret specifically the Theaetetus passage, but presents 
something like a general theory of evil and its sources that can be extracted from Plato’s dialogues (p. 
92ff). With this, however, he affirms the importance of the Theaetetus bit for Plato’s overall theory of 
evil.   
12 “The Theaetetus will formulate and examine the claim of the senses to yield knowledge. The 
discussion moves in the world of appearance and proves that, if we try to leave out of account the world 
of true being, we cannot extract knowledge from sensible experience.” (Cornford 1935, p. 7). A similar 
opinion is summarily expressed in Cherniss, Harold. “The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of 
Ideas”. (The American Journal of Philology 57. 4. 1936), pp. 449-451, and taken up by Guthrie: “The 
attempts to define knowledge in the main part of the dialogue are carried out by every means short of the 
doctrine of Forms, and end in failure. The digression assures us that the teaching of Phaedo and Republic, 
Symposium and Phaedrus has not been abandoned, and that the successful search for the nature of 
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 matter of fact, nothing precludes McDowell’s much milder supposition that if the theory of 
Forms is present in the Digression, it purpose could simply be to help Plato assert, contrary to the 
opinion of the anonymous opponents, that the moral values are firm and objective things.13 That 
issue is, however, immaterial for our purpose. What is not immaterial is the very question 
whether the Forms are indeed present in the Theaetetus,14 and here it deserves a little digression 
of its own.       
Some commentators are adamant in their claim that the Forms in the Theaetetus are 
conspicuous by the avoidance of their being properly discussed, as well as that there are more 
than a few unmistakable indications of their presence. Thus the already mentioned Cornford, 
Cherniss, Hackford and Guthrie. Others, like Robinson (1950), Cooper (1970)15 and Bostock 
(1988)16 are not in favor of that opinion. Still other scholars are not openly opposed to the idea 
that Plato lets in his theory of Forms through the back door,17 while some are quite comfortable 
with it.18 This is a huge and still ongoing debate which cannot be paid due attention here. What 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
knowledge lies beyond Plato’s self-imposed limitations here.” (1978, p. 91). For the author of the 
Didaskalikos as the Ancient Platonist precursor of Cornford’s theory, see Sedley, David. “Three Platonist 
Interpretations of the Theaetetus”. In Gill, Christopher and McCabe, Mary Margaret (eds.). Form and 
Argument in Later Plato (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996), pp. 89-93.  
13 See McDowell, John. Plato: Theaeteus, Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 
177 
14 I am actually concerned with the presence of the Forms in the Digression only, and will disregard few 
other places in the Theaetetus where Plato could be evoking them. For detailed discussion see Cornford 
1935, Robinson, Richard. “Forms and Error in Plato’s Theaetetus” (Philosophical Review, 59. 1. 1950), 
and Hackforth, Reginald. “Platonic Forms in the Theaetetus”. (The Classical Quarterly, 7. 1-2. 1957). 
They are, respectively, presenting an interpretation that accommodates the Forms into the Theaetetus, one 
that denies that they are mentioned or, even if so, that they serve any substantial purpose in the dialogue, 
and a vehement defense of the former position.  
15 Cooper’s article (Cooper, John M. “Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowledge (‘Theaetetus’ 184-186)”. 
(Phronesis, 15. 2. 1970)) is to a significant degree reaction to Cornford’s and Cherniss’ interpretation on 
Plato’s rejection of the thesis that knowledge is αἴσθησις. His criticism of the idea that the Forms are in 
any way invoked in Tht. 184b-186e is thorough and sustained. Nevertheless, he does not touch either 
upon the Digression or upon Socrates’ last unsuccessful attempt to define knowledge.      
16 Bostock understands the Theaetetus as taking a critical stance towards the Middle-period theory of 
Forms, especially towards their role as exclusive objects of cognition, and his arguments are again quite 
compelling. However, he, like Cooper, also never engages with the Digression, which apparently has a 
different tone and goal from the main bulk of the dialogue.   
17 See e.g. McDowell 1973, pp. 176f, Burnyeat 1990, pp. 38f  
18 See Sedley 2004, p. 71, Tschemplik, Andrea. Knowledge and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus 
(Plymouth: Lexington Books 2008), p. 143 
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 we can do, however, is to limit our ambition to the Digression and look for textual indications or 
evidence for the presence of Plato’s most characteristic doctrine of the Middle period.  
And indeed, there are at least three statements in the Digression where language and 
images are used which – especially when placed against the background of their context – are 
highly evocative of, and probably meant to call to the reader’s mind the transcendent Forms. The 
first one is at 174a1, where Socrates, after explaining to Theodorus that a first-class philosopher 
is oblivious of the things related to the body, presents the latter’s true interest: “exploring in 
every way the total nature of the things that are, each taken as a whole”19 (πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν 
ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου). The key word here is, of course, τὸ ὂν, which in the 
Platonic corpus is often used to refer to the Forms. The next indicative statement is at 174b, 
where Socrates depicts the philosopher as somebody who is almost unaware whether his 
neighbor is a man or some other creature, but is nevertheless highly interested to discover “what 
can a man possibly be” (τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, 174b3-4). This is very much reminiscent of 
the Platonic method of dialectical ascent from a sensible particular (in this case the individual 
human neighbor) to what-the-thing-itself-is (αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν: ἄνθρωπος, ἀγαθόν, κερκίς, ὂνομα, 
etc.). Still, the statement most suggestive of Plato’s theory of Forms at its best is to be found at 
175c, where the highest philosopher is depicted in his dealings with the others, when he is doing 
all he can to drag them out of their slavish state of worrying about mundane issues, and to 
engage them instead in the investigation of what justice, injustice, kingship, and happiness in 
themselves are. Here we have almost unmistakable allusion to the Allegory of the Cave of the 
Republic VII,20 complete with the missionary activities of the returnee from the spiritual journey 
to the Intelligible realm, and the necessary study of the eternal realities behind the particular 
entities and phenomena. 
But whenever, o friend, he drags someone upwards, someone who is willing to step out with him from the 
discourse ‘What wrong have I done to you or you to me?’ and into examination of justice and injustice 
themselves, what each of the two in itself is, and how they differ from everything else and from one 
another (… εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας, τί τε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ 
ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον, 175b9-175c3).  
                                                          
19 The translations from Greek are mine, unless noted otherwise.  
20 See, e.g., Cornford 1935, p. 86; Sedley 2004, p. 73 
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  These few passages are, of course, more suggestive than conclusive, but the arguments of 
the critics seem to be even less so. Robinson’s stance on the issue, which shall be briefly 
examined here, may be taken as representative of the critics’ camp, since his is the most vocal 
protest against the idea that the theory of Forms plays any role in the Theaetetus, the Digression 
included.  
There is some ambiguity involved in the first section of Robinson’s article “Forms and 
Error in Plato’s Theaetetus”. It is, namely, hard to clearly isolate his claim – is he trying to 
demonstrate that the Forms are “inconspicuous in the Theaetetus”, or that they “are absent from 
the Theaetetus”? The ambiguity is not only implicit, since on p. 10, while discussing Cornford’s 
interpretation of 185a-e – where knowing things that are common to all is mentioned – he writes: 
“[I] think it quite possible that they are Forms.” I shall nevertheless assume the latter, since that 
is how he closes the section on the Forms: “This account of the reason why the Forms do not 
appear in the Theaetetus…”21  
Robinson builds up his case on several assumptions, but those which are not concerned 
with the Digression itself will be omitted. We shall focus on three. Firstly, he writes that two 
doctrines closely associated with the theory of Forms are absent from the dialogue, “[n]amely 
recollection and the absolute difference of knowledge from opinion.”22 However, nobody claims 
that the fully developed theory of Forms with all its auxiliaries is presented in the Theaetetus; the 
whole idea is that its inconspicuousness, combined with the occasional strong allusions to it, 
should help any “Platonist [to] draw the necessary inference.”23  
Secondly, on p. 5 he insists that “The general atmosphere of the dialogue seems 
unfavorable to the theory of Forms”, especially “the empiricist and subjectivist tone of the 
Theaetetus”. It is a fact that all theories of knowledge discussed in the Theaetetus are either 
strongly subjective or empirical or both, that they involve knowing particulars, etc. But does that 
mean that Plato himself is holding an empiricist’s stance? Certainly not. Socrates, after all, is 
satisfied with none of the attempts to discover the essence of knowledge. Guthrie writes: “[a]ll 
empirical and subjective theories discussed are shown to fall, and the dialogue could be regarded 
                                                          
21 Robinson 1950, p. 18 
22 Op. cit., p. 3 
23 Cornford 1935, p. 162. Besides, as we learn from Sedley 1996, pp. 95ff, some ancient Platonist argued 
that the theory of recollection was indirectly alluded to in some passages of the Theaetetus.  
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 as a demonstration of their inadequacy.”24 Moreover, the spirit of the Digression is not only non-
empiricist and favorable to the Forms, but even requires them strongly.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, Robinson writes: “[In the Theaetetus] There is little or no 
talk about two worlds”,25 and:  
The theory of Forms is the theory that there is a second world, of objects which, unlike the objects here, 
have the attributes of being perfect, unchanging, eternal, divine, etc.; and this theory is not implied by the 
Theaetetus’ description of the philosopher [in the Digression] though it is not denied either.26  
It is very hard to justify these claims in the face of the evidence from the Digression. As 
far as the first one is concerned, there actually is a strong indication of the existence of two 
separate realms, to which objects of sensation and thought are respectively delegated: 
But in fact only his body reposes and has its home in the city, while his mind … rushes, as Pindar says, 
both ‘beneath the earth’, measuring its surface, and ‘beyond the sky’, observing the stars, and exploring in 
every way the total nature of the things that are, each taken as a whole, not at all lowering itself to what is 
close at hand.” (173e2-174a2).27  
 Furthermore, even a negligent reader is bound to stumble upon the explicit mention of 
two worlds at 176a8-b1: “Therefore one ought to endeavor to flee from this world to the other as 
fast as possible”. The divinity and eternity of the other realm, denied by Robinson in the second 
quotation above, is again strongly asserted in the Digression. Taking a flight from here is 
accomplished by becoming as godlike as possible, while emulating god is advised since his state 
of being stands in stark contrast with the state of affairs in this world. Then again, there is a very 
clear account of bifurcation of the All, which does not leave much hope for Robinson’s purpose: 
we hear of two paradigms established in reality, one of divine happiness, the other of godless 
wretchedness.28 Those who lead a life of unrighteousness will become more and more like the 
                                                          
24 Guthrie 1978, p. 66 
25 Robinson, ibid.  
26 Op. cit., p. 9 
27 Sedley (2004, p. 71) concludes his interpretation of the passage thus: “The philosopher’s flight to the 
heaven, his act of intellectual self-distancing from civic concerns, is for Plato his transportation from 
sensible to intelligible world, where the truly non-relativized paradigm of justice, and the other Forms, are 
to be found.” 
28 Plato’s own words are: παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων …, and he does not mention 
anything like ‘the All’. By it here I mean το ὅλον, all there is, including both the transcendent world and 
the world of Becoming. The two patterns would then be reminiscent of the two possible models that any 
craftsman may use, spoken of in the Timaeus 28a6-b4 – the unchanging and the generated one. This 
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 latter, and will be shunned from the region where there is no evil (176e-177a). The first 
paradigm’s divinity naturally invokes the other properties that are, according to Robinson, 
missing here, namely perfection, eternity, etc. Its perfection is implied, inter alia, by the fact that 
it is free from evils, while its eternity is implied by the allusion to the process of reincarnation of 
the wicked in this world, which is said to continue for all time (ἀεί). If existence, though 
extended through a spectrum of diverse life forms, goes on uninterrupted for the wicked, how 
much more stable and permanent is it for the righteous, inhabiting the divine realm?  
Besides the strong other-worldly spirit of the above quoted passages, there are in the 
Digression those allusions to the Forms themselves that were already mentioned above. And 
even if Robinson were justified in his attempt to explain away 175c, which its insistence on 
investigation of justice and happiness themselves, as simply Socratic “request for definition of 
the essence,”29 which does not presuppose the theory of Forms, it is hard to see how the same 
strategy could be applied to 174b. Therein, as already said, while describing the ‘leader in 
philosophy’, Socrates says that he invests all his efforts in the attempt to ascertain what man is, 
and what powers and properties distinguish this nature from any other (174b3-5). Considering 
that the prime Socratic objects of investigation were the definitions of the ethical and aesthetic 
concepts, like virtue, pleasure, beauty, etc., inquiry into the nature, properties and differentia of 
man seems instead quite Platonic and hence might have firm foundation in the theory of Forms. 
Therefore, I believe it is safe to conclude that, for one reason or another, the most eminent 
Platonic doctrine finds its place in the Theaetetus.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
understanding involves a very loose sense of τὸ ὂν – reality as including both Being and Becoming, since 
the latter is not mere illusion (the following are some of the passages where Plato ascribes, indirectly or 
directly, certain kind of existence to the world of Becoming: Phd. 79a; Tht. 182c-183c; Tim. 35a, 37a-b, 
52a-d, Phil. 23c-27c, etc.). Admittedly, making up one’s mind on the question what these paradigms 
actually are is not an easy task. ‘Reality’ could be taken to refer to the realm of Forms, while the patterns 
would be e.g. the Form of Virtue and the Form of Vice. Presently it is not possible to discuss the 
unresolved issue whether Plato admits into his ontology Forms corresponding to bad things (e.g. 
Cherniss, Harold. “The Sources of Evil According to Plato”. (Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 98. 1. 1954), p. 27 is adamant that he does, Guthrie (1978, p. 97ff) sits on the fence). Third option 
is that the paradigm ‘of divine happiness’ represents God: “The wording, taken in context, makes it 
virtually explicit that the good paradigm that we are urged to imitate is, once again, god” (Sedley 2004, p. 
78f). Nevertheless, regardless of which interpretation is assumed, it remains undisputable that Plato here, 
against Robinson’s contention, draws clear distinction between a province divine and its opposite.   
29 Robinson, ibid.  
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 3. Evil in the Theaetetus 176a 
 
After this necessary excursus from our main topic, it is now time to go back to the 
Theaetetus 176a-b and the seeming opposition of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὰ κακά mentioned there. 
Despite its briefness, the passage may be interpreted as containing some valuable insights into 
the issue, possibly developed by Plato in the later dialogues in some more detail. Plotinus, for 
example, clearly acknowledges its importance, and refers to it rather often. He starts Ennead I.2, 
by quoting a part of this passage,30 and comments on it in Ennead I.8.6, which is rather apposite, 
since treatise I.8 is entitled “On What Are and Whence Come Evils.” He brings it up once again 
in III.2.5 and III.2.15, where important theodicean questions are discussed. It is thus clear that 
those few sentences from the Theaetetus are one of the most prominent threads woven into the 
fabric of his own theory of evil.31  
What could, then, be the import of the passage on evil as presented by Plato in the 
Theaetetus? Thematically, it may be analyzed as being constituted of two parts. The first one 
states that the evils cannot be eradicated (176a4-5): ἀλλ' οὔτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν,32 and 
gives the reason why it is so (176a5-6): ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη.33 The 
second ascribes a particular location to the evils, calls attention to their inevitability, and possibly 
their origin as well (176a6-8): οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν 
τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.34  
 
 
 
                                                          
30 “Since the evils are here and prowl about this place as a matter of necessity, and since the soul desires 
to escape the evils, it must flee from here” (Enn. I.2.1.1). Plotinus goes on, following the text of the 
Theaetetus, to identify the escape with becoming similar to god, and becoming similar to god with 
becoming perfectly virtuous. The interesting step is his claim that the god in question is the World Soul.     
31 Armstrong, Arthur Hillary. (tr.). Plotinus: Ennead III (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 
1993), p. 60, n. 1, is even more convinced in its importance: “The often-repeated quotation from Plato, 
Theaetetus 176A5, one of the cardinal texts of Plotinian Neoplatonism.” 
32 “But it is not possible that the evils should be destroyed.”   
33 “For it is necessary that the Good always has some opposite.” 
34 “Nor it is possible that they are situated among the gods, but they prowl about the mortal nature and this 
place as a matter of necessity.”   
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 3.1 The status of τὸ ἀγαθόν in 176a6 
 
A point of primary importance with regard to the first part of the passage on evil is that 
by the mention of τὸ ἀγαθόν, Plato does not want to refer to any particular good, but to the Good 
itself. This is, of course, just an assumption, although several reasons for its plausibility may be 
offered, listed here in increasing order of substantiality.  
A) In the Theaetetus there is a single mention (and that one in the center of the dialogue) 
of the good with a definite article and in the singular, which is, since the Republic, a standard 
Platonic locution for the highest reality. This certainly does not prove anything, but is highly 
reminiscent of the singularity and centrality of the Form of the Good in Plato’s philosophy.  
B) One undisputable purpose of the Digression is to draw a contrast between civic, i.e. 
apparent, and true or philosophic virtue. Plato holds that not only the common so-called boons of 
aristocratic lineage and wealth, but even highly commendable qualities like being pious or 
courageous, when used unwisely, cease to be good. Hence, the vital element of philosophic 
virtue is knowledge.35 Knowledge, on the other hand, is primarily of the Forms, while all of them 
owe both their being and knowability to the Good. Virtue, thus, ultimately depends on the Good. 
And vice, if opposite of virtue, has to depend on something that stands as the Good’s opposite. 
This allows for the interpretation of τὸ ἀγαθόν in 176a4-6 as the Good, provided the ὑπεναντίον 
is understood as distinct from, and underlying, τα κακά, a thesis which will be discussed later. 
C) In a similar vein, I believe that a reader who carefully takes into account the broader 
context of the Digression, as well as the foregoing attempt to show that Plato’s theory of Forms 
is at least implicit in it, would agree that the conclusion of the latter shouldn’t be taken lightly. 
And if the Forms are indeed there in the Digression, it is small wonder that in its most 
remarkable passage, where Socrates is talking of the good and the evil, of god and salvation, 
Plato’s highest principle would also be evoked.  
D) Finally, had Plato not had in mind the Good while writing 176a, it would be hard to 
determine what he was referring to. Some particular good, like pleasure or virtue? But that is not 
                                                          
35 Socrates famously believed that all virtue is knowledge (as argued in the Laches, 194d ff, especially 
199c, and in the Protagoras, 332a-360d and 361b), and Plato never really disassociated himself from his 
master’s stance on the issue. An echo of this understanding in the Theaetetus Digression is found in 
Plato’s exhortation to become as similar to god as possible. That aim is achieved by becoming just and 
pious, through wisdom.   
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 possible. For one thing, were that the case, Plato should have used plural number of the noun 
(τἄγαθα), its counterpart being in plural as well (τὰ κακά). For another, Plato never considers any 
particular ‘good’ to be a proper good at all; pleasure had been dismissed as such already in, e.g. 
the Euthydemus and the Gorgias. Furthermore, since the philosopher of the Digression has been 
depicted as someone who soars high with his interests, ‘seeking after the total nature of each of 
the things that are’ (174a1), it would be absurd to assume that τὸ ἀγαθόν here designates material 
gain or some civic virtue. Could it, however, refer to ‘philosophic virtue,’ or to virtue as an 
absolute value? This proposal seems to be in tune with the overall tone of the Digression, where 
the philosopher’s virtues, like justice and piety, stand in stark contrast to those of a rhetor 
absorbed in legal practice. That would, however, again lead us to the Forms: “True justice is to 
be found only after an intellectual ascent to the intelligible world outside the cave. For Plato true 
justice is a Form…”36 Now, once we find ourselves in the transcendent realm, it is quite natural 
to suppose that Plato would bring into the picture the one Form on which all the rest depend – 
which he actually does by writing down its name. Even if it weren’t explicitly mentioned, at least 
since the Republic it is known that any Form, including the moral ones like Justice, is “[i]tself 
fully understandable only in the light of a yet higher entity, the Form of the Good …”37 
Therefore, the assumption that the thing in question here is the Good itself seems to be all but 
unreasonable and unacceptable.  
 
3.2 The status of the ὑπεναντίον in 176a6  
 
The next thing to be noted in the first part of the passage under scrutiny is Plato’s claim 
that the Good always has some opposite, and has it in a specific way, namely necessarily 
(ἀνάγκη). But what does Plato mean by this opposition? Certainly not that human experience 
must include both the good and the bad, both joys and sorrows, both pleasures and pains. First, 
because I already tried to argue that Plato’s use of τὸ ἀγαθόν has a deeper purport, and second, 
because such a statement is rather trivial. Nor is he claiming that wherever there is virtue, there 
has to be vice; within the confines of Platonic philosophy that is simply false. As Plotinus points 
                                                          
36 Sedley 2004, p. 76 
37 Ιbid.  
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 out, there is an escape from the evils of the soul,38 and his opinion is clearly traceable back to 
Plato’s writings, like, e.g., the creation story of the Timaeus, and thus easily confirmable as 
Platonic. It is not only that death, vice and other evils do not abide among the celestial gods,39 
but even the souls of the mortals are eligible for full redemption and re-appropriation of their 
constitutional state of purity.40 It can be also deduced from the Theaetetus itself that those who 
are true philosophers and look upon the divine paradigm live lives free of vice, and 
consequently, to a large extent free of evil. This means that the existence of virtue does not 
necessitate the presence of virtue’s opposite, i.e. vice. Therefore, my assumption is that the 
opposite Plato is talking about has to be some kind of principle, taking into consideration the 
earlier claim that the Good was a principle, and Plato’s statement that it has an opposite. The 
discussion of what kind of principle it is has to be postponed for another occasion. In what 
immediately follows, only a few hints will be given. In the Theaetetus, Plato himself leaves the 
issue open, and does not disclose anything about the nature and the properties of that opposite. 
Two points, however, have to be mentioned.  
a)  The opposite (ὑπεναντίον τι) spoken of here is different from the evils described as 
indestructible. These, as it is obvious from the use of the plural (τὰ κακά), are some individual 
evils, and cannot be the proper opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν Plato is referring to. This would be so even 
regardless of whether τὸ ἀγαθόν is understood as some good, or the Good. In the first case, the 
evils cannot play the role of the opposite of the good because they are many, while one single 
thing can have one opposite only, as already argued in Protagoras 322a-333b. In the second, 
because Plato seems to equate those evils with the opposites of justice, piety and wisdom (Tht. 
176b1-3), as aptly noted by Plotinus as well: τὰ κακὰ αὐτῷ ἡ κακία καὶ ὅσα ἐκ κακίας.41 Since 
the evils, which are here mostly moral insufficiencies, already have their appropriate opposites, 
                                                          
38 Enn. I.8.5.30 
39 The Demiurge, intent on the task to produce the four orders of creatures, first created the celestial gods 
and made them ‘living beings divine and eternal.’ See Tim. 40a-b, 41a-b 
40 Even the souls which were deeply implicated in matter can rise above the cycle of repeated incarnation 
and be reinstituted to their original position, provided in this life they manage to align the revolutions of 
their own circles with those of the circles of the Cosmic Soul. See Tim. 42c-d 
41  “For him, the evils are vice and those things that arise from vice” (Enn.Ι.8.6.13). The escape from this 
world Plato is talking about in the Theaetetus is accomplished by acquiring justice and piety guided by 
wisdom. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that what is to be escaped from, the evils, is human 
wickedness, i.e. injustice, impiety, ignorance and the rest. That is actually explicitly stated a bit later on, 
when the account of the two paradigms is introduced (176e3-177a3).   
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.1. p. 66-98, 2017. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i1p66-98 
79
 i.e. the virtues, and since those virtues are not, as argued above, what Plato is referring to by his 
use of τὸ ἀγαθόν, the latter’s opposite should be sought somewhere else.  
b) Plato’s choice of the Greek term that we usually translate with the English word 
‘opposite’ or ‘contrary’ seems to be deliberate and significant. He is not using the much more 
customary ἐναντίον, but combines it with the preposition ὑπό, in order to get ὑπεναντίον. This 
compounded word, in the given context, could denote a notion of contrariety in which one 
member of the pair subsists on a lower level than the other, an opposite which is somehow 
subordinate or inferior. And indeed, while the opposites of warm and cold or pleasure and pain 
share equal ontological status, the same cannot be said of the Good and its opposite. The former 
is the source of being and knowability of the eternal Realities (Rep. 509b), while all that one can 
say about the latter is that it is coeval with the Good (ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι), and 
that it has to lag far behind it in respect of its ontological weight.42 
 
3.3 The status of τὰ κακά and their relation to the ὑπεναντίον 
 
At this point it is not unimportant to note that in the above quoted Levett-Burnyeat 
translation of the passage, singular is used for τὰ κακά. The English sentence thus construed is 
bound to give the wrong impression that the evils and the opposite of the Good are one and the 
same thing. The same mistake is committed by Kennedy, but not by Cornford, McDowell, 
Chappell and Sedley, although they also seem to follow the Levett-Burnyeat interpretation. In 
Chappell’s translation, the passage runs as follows: “But it is not possible for evils to be 
destroyed, Theodorus. There always has to be something opposite to the good.” I am singling 
him out, because he adds a footnote to his translation: “Even Plato nods; this feeble untruism is 
                                                          
42 As far as Plato’s successors are concerned, it is worth to mention that, while Plotinus does not pay 
much heed to the relatively uncommon substitute for the regular ἐναντίον, Proclus takes it as a deliberate 
and deeply significant step on Plato’s part. As a matter of fact, Proclus also recognizes that Plato’s 
intention behind the application of this word was to indicate a kind of contrariety different from the 
usually expected one; he, however, ascribes a more specific and much more complex meaning to it. 
Plato’s ὑπεναντίον with Proclus acquires a unique sense of subcontrariety – of course, without having 
anything in common with the Aristotelian subcontrariety of the Square of Opposites – i.e. it becomes an 
opposite which is not only subordinate to and of lower ontological status than the Good, but whose very 
being and power to oppose the latter is ultimately derived from it (see De Malorum Subsistentia 49, 50, 
54).      
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 unworthy of him. It is true that the concept of evil must always have content so long as the 
concept of good has. It does not follow that evil must actually exist so long as good does.”43 Had 
Plato really intended to say what Chappell in the last sentence claims he did, he would have been 
guilty not only of untruism, but of inconsistency as well. An attempt was made earlier to show 
that Plato couldn’t have thought what Chappell imputes to him, since that would contradict some 
of his important and emphatic claims elsewhere. Therefore, Plato’s claim needn’t be read as a 
lapse if one accepts the interpretation submitted in this text, according to which he intends to 
impress upon his readers a metaphysical claim, which is that the Good as a principle necessarily 
has an opposite. He is not talking of any kind of relation between some particular good and evil, 
which would, besides everything else, be totally out of the context of the Digression.  
Another critic, who also holds that the evils are identical with the opposite Plato is 
bringing up in the passage, comments more extensively on the point, and takes Chappell’s 
objection to the extreme. He writes:  
[E]vils cannot perish because there must always be something contrary to the good. If this is the case, 
then the existence of that which is good in itself must be dubious: that which is good is so only in relation 
to something else, specifically, in relation to evil. Without evil, good does not exist. But why must good 
exist only in relation to evil?44  
Is Stern justified in raising this objection to the nature and the implications of Plato’s 
contrariety? I do not think that Plato could be plausibly accused of upholding such an outlook.  
Stern takes the opposites Plato is talking about in the sense of strongly relative terms, whose 
description does not only imply a relation to one another; they are also defined as relative, and 
cannot even exist independently of their respective correlative. This understanding could 
probably be applied with some accuracy to Heraclitus’ opposites. He is a philosopher who seems 
to be an adherent of unmitigated relativism on the matter of both perception and value-
judgments. For him, it is not only that “the way up and the way down are one and the same” (DK 
B60), and “the sea is water purest and most impure” (DK B61), but even, according to 
Hippolytus’ comment in B58, the good and the bad are one. Although Heraclitus, at least in the 
                                                          
43 Chappell, Timothy. Reading Plato’s Theaetetus (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 2004), p. 
125 
44 Stern 2002, p. 283 
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 case of value-judgments, is taking god’s eye view,45 his opposites are still highly inter-
dependent, incomplete and insignificant without each other. “Members of pairs of correlatives, 
such as good and evil, or sickness and health, or justice and injustice, have significance only in 
relation to their opposites.”46  
For Plato no such strong relativity is included in the concepts of the opposites, especially 
not so in the case of the positive values. While their imperfect instantiations on the material 
plane of course do have opposites, from the absolute perspective, as Forms, they are both 
independent and transcendent, while badness and worthlessness seem to be reduced to just 
various degrees of insufficiencies, having their cause in the primary insufficiency,47 to which 
some attention will be given later. As a matter of fact, Plato does make use of the notion of 
strongly inter-dependent opposites, in one of the crucial passages of the Phaedo, namely in his 
first proof of the immortality of the soul (70c-72d). But that is an argument concerned with the 
phenomenon of change, does not include any value-concepts, and is moreover flawed in many 
ways. Plato’s employment of the Cyclical argument gives no justification for Stern’s objection 
that good cannot exist without evil, if the latter has to be a contrary to the former. Plato never 
claims that beauty cannot exist without ugliness, or life cannot exist without death. However, his 
objection could be used as a reductio ad absurdum argument against the position that appears to 
be generally accepted, and according to which the ὑπεναντίον of τὸ ἀγαθόν are τὰ κακά. Were it 
so, the road for Stern’s challenge would be wide open. Yet, it is highly improbable that Plato 
would commit such a grave mistake as to bring in question ‘the existence of that which is good’, 
and make it good ‘only in relation to evil’. It is especially dubious that such a slip could be made 
in a piece of writing where Plato is obviously advocating the superiority of some higher-rate 
goods, as opposed to the apparent goods, accepted as valuable only by the commoners. 
Therefore, it is much more plausible to suppose that the error is Stern’s: that which is opposed to 
                                                          
45 “To god, everything is beautiful, good and just, while people take some things to be unjust, some just” 
(DK B102). 
46 Greene, William Chase. “Fate, Good and Evil in Pre-Socratic Philosophy” (Harvard Studies in 
Classical Philology, 47. 1936), p. 101 
47 “[B]adness in all its varieties may prove to be definable merely in terms of deviation from the relevant 
good ideal – unlike a symmetrically related pair such as large-small or odd-even, each of which has its 
own intrinsic nature and is therefore not adequately definable in terms of its opposite’s absence” (Sedley 
2004, p.78, fn. 120).   
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 the Good are not the individual evils (τὰ κακά). They are just the opposite’s symptoms, a 
confirmation that it must exist.  
 
3.4 The status of ἀνάγκη at 176a6 and its relation to the ὑπεναντίον 
 
In the two clauses on evil, Plato uses the word ‘necessity’ (ἀνάγκη) twice. In its first 
appearance ἀνάγκη adverbially modifies the clause ‘there is always some opposite to the 
Good’,48 and turns it into a modal proposition. This seems like a statement of de re modality, an 
assertion that the Good necessarily has the property of having an opposite.49 It is an assertion of 
indispensable relation of the following kind: the object in question couldn’t conceivably have 
lacked the property in question.50  
The question that imposes itself is whether this position is justifiable in the face of 
Aristotle’s adamant claim in the Categories that there can be no opposite, or contrary, to 
substance,51 granted that the Good is substance or even something above substance. Besides the 
question whether the Good can have an opposite at all, it is a fortiori dubitable why it should 
necessarily52 have that opposite. To these questions only highly tentative answers can be offered. 
As for the first one, Plotinus attempts to deal with it by amending Aristotle’s definition of 
contraries or opposites: “things set furthest apart from each other, while belonging to the same 
genus” (Cat. 6a17-18).53 He certainly acknowledges that this definition is applicable to most of 
the pairs of opposites, i.e. to all those which belong to the same species or genus, like white and 
                                                          
48 More precisely, it modifies the nominal predicate ὑπεναντίον εἶναι.  
49 That is to say that the modal operator does not range over the dictum, or the proposition as a whole, but 
over the res, or the thing the proposition is about. In other words, the claim is not that the proposition is 
necessarily true, but that a certain something necessarily possesses a certain property.      
50 See Plantinga, Alvin. “De Re et De Dicto” (Nous, 3. 3. 1969), p. 236  
51 “Now it belongs also to substances that they have no opposite. For, what would be an opposite to 
primary substance? Just as nothing is an opposite to this man, neither to man nor animal anything is an 
opposite.” (Cat. 3b24-27) 
52 “But how can anything be an opposite to this Good? For it is not a quality. Then, what absolute 
necessity is there if one of the opposites exists, the other must also exist?” (Enn. I.8.6.21-23) 
53 τὰ γὰρ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται. For a more detailed 
account of Plotinus’ position on the issue of contrariety, see O’Brien, Denis. “Plotinus on Matter and 
Evil”. In Gerson, Lloyd P. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press 2006), pp. 175ff 
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 black, justice and injustice, pleasure and pain. Still, those that are to be considered opposites par 
excellence (μάλιστα ἂν εἴη ἐναντία) are definable as simply “things furthest removed from each 
other” (Enn. I.8.6.40-41),54 without belonging to the same genus. Such are the contraries of the 
Good and its opposite. Plotinus’ reasoning could be something like the following: The fact that 
the Good exists is taken as axiomatic truth, while the presence of various good things, like 
reason, soul, life, virtues, etc., is rather obvious. Everything good and noble has its origin in the 
Good and depends on it for its subsistence. However, it is equally obvious that there are bad 
things as well – passions, body, death, vice, etc. They have to have their origin either in 
something, or in nothing. But nothing comes from nothing, so they have to originate in 
something. Since that entity cannot be the Good, it has to be something else. Moreover, since the 
Good fathers goodness and excellence, that other something, being the originator of badness and 
depravity, cannot have anything in common with the Good, and has to be at the furthest remove 
from it. So, if the origin of good things and the origin of bad things do not belong to the same 
genus and are furthest away from each other, then they fit Plotinus’ definition of opposites. 
Therefore, the Good does have an opposite.55 The line of this argument seems straightforward 
and unproblematic.  
The question why the Good must necessarily have an opposite is even more puzzling, 
since the modal operator seems to impose some kind of restrictive boundary on the Good’s 
absolute independence, which should not be put in doubt. At this point, it is rather difficult to 
decide on the question, but what seems plausible is that the necessity spoken of here refers to the 
relation of the worlds of Being and Becoming. In order for creation to unfold at all, it needs to be 
inferior to the uncreated realm, or else it would be an exact replica of the world of Being. 
However, that is meaningless, since the latter already exists and has been existing since eternity. 
And in order for creation to be inferior, it ought to owe its inferiority to something. The cause of 
that inferiority, without which the created cosmos simply would not be there, is not explicitly 
                                                          
54τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων ἀφεστηκότα. 
55  To illustrate his point that even ordinary substances could be opposites, Plotinus gives a counterfactual 
example: if fire and water were not adhering in a common substrate, i.e. matter, but were independently 
constituted of the pairs hot-dry and wet-cold, they would be opposites, in the same way as the qualities 
that presently occur in them are (III.8.6.49-55). 
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 disclosed until the Timaeus.56 The cosmos is a place of tension and shortcomings exactly because 
it is composed of contrary principles: “For mixed indeed was the origination of this cosmos, 
which was engendered by the bringing together of Reason and Necessity” (Tim. 47e5-a2). I 
believe that the second principle spoken of in the Timaeus is identical with the opposite of the 
Good in the Theaetetus Digression. This ὑπεναντίον represents the ‘lowest point’ of the world of 
Becoming, and thus stands in opposition to the uppermost entity in the world of Being, i.e. the 
Good. It is also one of the two causes of the created cosmos, and in this way a necessary opposite 
of the Good, granted that the creation was prompted by the intrinsic nature of the higher reality.57 
In sum, since the world of Becoming was unfolded by necessity, and had to be made inferior to 
the world of Being, there necessarily had to be a cause of that inferiority as well. Thus the First 
and the Last are opposites, and furthermore necessarily so.58 The ὑπεναντίον of the Theaetetus 
Digression is a brute fact that cannot be circumvented. Now it is also clear why it is not possible 
that the evils should be destroyed – “because some things are lesser than others in comparison 
with the nature of good” (Enn.III.2.5.30), and the further they go, the lesser is their share in the 
good. At the bottom of the ontological ladder there is the ὑπεναντίον, which is furthest away 
from the ‘nature of good’. It thus represents the ultimate depravation, and since many things 
partially receive their nature from this entity, they cannot but appropriate its depravity and 
imperfection, and are therefore perceived as evil. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
physical world is overcome by evil; on the contrary, it is the most beautiful of things born 
(29a6), a single visible god, greatest, most excellent, most beautiful and perfect (92c5-9). 
It seems that by this Plato claims that whatever is, is as it should be. Even badness, of 
necessity present in the world, somehow contributes to the overall beauty and perfection of the 
                                                          
56 With regard to the relative chronology of the Theaetetus and the Timaeus (and the Laws), I follow the 
traditional (post-Campbellian) ordering, which places the Theaetetus among the (later) middle dialogues, 
and the Timaeus among the latest group (for an article-length survey of the developments in the area of 
stylometry and other methods of the dialogues’ relative dating, see Brandwood, Leonard. “Stylometry and 
Chronology”. In Kraut, Richard (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Plato. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1992)). Owen’s arguments in favor of earlier composition of the Timaeus (in Owen, 
Gwilym Ellis Lane. “The Place of the Timaeus in Plato’s Dialogues”. (The Classical Quarterly 3. 1/2. 
1953), have been successfully rebutted by Cherniss, Harold. “The Relation of the Timaeus to Plato’s 
Later Dialogues”. (The American Journal of Philology 78. 3. 1957).   
57 In the language of the Timaeus, the sole reason for the visible cosmos’ unfolding was the Demiurge’s 
goodness, which propelled him to organize the things in the best possible way (see 29e-30a).  
58 ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἔσχατον – “As necessarily must exist that which 
comes after the first, so must the last” (Enn. I.8.7.21-22).    
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 whole. Mortality, the prime evil for most of us, is also given its proper place in the grand picture, 
and is not something that Plato rejects as being incompatible with the goodness of the creator and 
the beauty of the creation. Since the cosmos is made in the likeness of the most perfect model, 
the intelligible Living Being (30c-d), in order to be perfect and complete it has to contain all the 
orders of entities present in the paradigm (41b-c). However, these entities, being reflections of 
the eternal beings present in the paradigm, have to be lesser than the latter, and thereof their 
ephemerality. Archer-Hind writes: “The scheme of existence involves a material counterpart of 
the ideal world. To materiality belong becoming and perishing: accordingly αἰσθητὰ ζῷα, the 
copies of νοητὰ ζῷα, must, so far as material, be mortal.”59 Even the celestial gods are not 
immortal per se, although they are granted assurance of indissolubility by their creator (41a).  
As for the idea that the world is made up of opposites, it is as old as Greek philosophy. 
For Plato, the basic opposition is the one pointed out in the Theaetetus: τὸ ἀγαθόν and its 
ὑπεναντίον. Taylor ads that, in order to be perfect, the world has to contain all the pairs of 
opposites; mortality-immortality is just such a pair, moreover a very prominent one,60 and hence 
the unblemished role of mortality in the cosmic drama. Therefore, the opposite of the Good is no 
positive Evil; it is a limiting factor, a principle of imperfection that makes the world of 
Becoming what it is.    
 
3.5 ‘Mortal nature’ and the evils 
 
The second part of the passage on evil, namely: “Nor is it possible that they [the evils] are 
situated among the gods, but they prowl about the mortal nature and this place as a matter of 
necessity,” is rather straightforward. Plato’s claim that evils do not abide among the gods does 
not require much comment. His theology, although at face value contains many elements of the 
traditional religion, is nevertheless thoroughly reformed. By the end of book II and the beginning 
of book III of the Republic, as well as in the Laws 899d-907b he argues for the absolute purity 
and goodness of the gods, while in the Demiurge’s address to the gods (Tim. 41b-d) their 
                                                          
59 Archer-Hind, Richard D. The Timaeus of Plato: Edited with Introduction and Notes (London: 
Macmillan and Co. 1888), p. 140 
60 Taylor, Alfred E. A Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1928), p. 253 
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 immunity to death and injury is proclaimed. Thus, they will live forever beyond the reach of 
moral and physical evils. 
 ‘The mortal nature’ spoken of here asks for more attention. In this respect the above 
quoted Levett-Burnyet translation again goes somewhat off the mark: Plato is not talking of 
‘human nature’, but of mortal nature. Kennedy, Cornford, McDowell have ‘our mortal nature’, 
which could also be misleading, since we conventionally count ourselves among human beings. 
Chappell is close to the original, with ‘this mortal nature’, although the demonstrative pronoun is 
absent from the Greek text. Sedley is most accurate, with the plain ‘mortal nature’. Stern, as 
already mentioned, dedicates a few paragraphs to the passage on evil, and specifically comments 
on the phrase we are interested in in this section. He, perhaps to a certain degree justifiably, 
points out that the evils attached to the mortal nature represent the ungodly finitude and 
imperfection, of which death is the most ominous sign.61 Then he goes on to say: “All living 
things are mortal and thus needy. But in associating the notions of good and evil with this 
neediness Socrates and his interlocutors have in mind specifically human neediness.”62 He 
supports his last point by two textual references: 176a4, where Theodorus expresses his hope that 
if more people were receptive to the Socratic ideals, there would be much less evils among 
humans; 176a8-b2, where the advice to become as similar to god as possible by perfecting 
oneself morally is obviously applicable to human beings alone. Stern thus advances two closely 
connected claims, namely a) The evils Socrates is talking about stand for neediness or lack of 
self-sufficiency, most fully exemplified in mortality; and b) Socrates and his interlocutors are 
exclusively interested in human neediness. These claims call for a short comment.  
First, although finitude, imperfection and suffering are by no means excluded from the 
extension of the term τὰ κακά, Socrates in the Theaetetus primarily directs the readers’ attention 
to some other kind of badness. Wisdom, justice and piety are among the key words in the 
Digression, and the divergent understanding and application of these concepts is what makes the 
difference between the philosopher and the rhetor frequenting the courts of law. Those who stick 
to the mundane or civic variants of the above are not able to investigate Justice itself (175c2), nor 
become as just as possible (176c2), and thus sink into worthlessness and unmanliness (οὐδενία τε 
καὶ ἀνανδρία) (176c4), being overpowered by ignorance and wickedness (ἀμαθία καὶ κακία) 
                                                          
61 See Stern 2002, p. 283 
62 Ibid., italics added.  
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 (176c5). These unfortunate men and women are obviously the same persons who, turning 
themselves to the supremely unhappy pattern, remain confined to the place which is infested 
with evils (176e-177a). It seems that the evil which human beings experience is to a high degree 
based on moral imperfection, whose root, on the other hand, is lack of wisdom, i.e. ignorance. 
One of the lessons of the Digression is that by perfecting oneself morally through wisdom, one 
can even do away with mortality. Thus the neediness that characterizes us insofar as we are 
mortal, referred to by Stern as the real meaning of τὰ κακά, turns out to be a symptom of some 
more basic ‘force of evil’, which is, in the Theaetetus Digression, lack of virtue, and ultimately 
ignorance. This should suffice as a comment on Stern’s first claim.63  
As for the second, according to which the neediness in question is exclusively human 
neediness, the aforesaid could be used as a further confirmation of its verity. Non-human animals 
are incapable of both moral and intellectual lapses and improvements. This being so, I still 
believe that the mortal nature spoken of in the passage on evil has broader meaning. The phrase 
τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν, after all, simply does not mean ‘human’ or ‘our nature’. In the Platonic 
context it refers to the living entities lesser than the gods,64 i.e. to the variety of winged creatures, 
of those who live in water, and of those who have feet and roam the planes and mountains (Tim. 
40a1-2). These are the creatures characterized by mortal nature, and out of them, human beings 
are but one species. Then, Plato’s usage of the phrase τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν could mean that for him 
the problem of evil pertains to non-human animals as well. This would be so not only due to his 
acknowledgement of animal suffering, but primarily due to his acceptance of the doctrine of 
metempsychosis. He has already argued for the doctrine of metempsychosis – more or less 
directly in the Phaedo, indirectly in the Meno – and it served as a very useful background for 
presenting significant philosophical points. Such a function is shared by the myths in the 
Gorgias, Phaedo, Phaedrus, the striking myth of Er in the Republic X, parts of Timaeus’ account 
of the secondary creation, etc. Therefore, there are three kinds of living entities who share the 
same mortal nature, because all of them experience death and badness, and all of them were, are, 
or will be conscious of it, once they attain to human form of life. Life of philosophy and moral 
improvement are, according to this picture, not restricted only to those presently embodied as 
                                                          
63 With regard to the problem of mortality, see also pp. 28f above.  
64 Plotinus in Enn. I.8.6.5-10 writes that ‘mortal nature’ and ‘this place’ (ἡ θνητὴ φύσις καὶ ὅδε ὁ τόπος) 
mean the earth, where there is injustice and disorder, as opposed to heaven which is clean of evil.  
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 human beings; save for the few extremely unjust and sinful souls eternally imprisoned in the 
Tartarus, everybody will sooner or later be given the chance to perfect their existence.65   
His analysis of τὰ κακά and τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν makes Stern draw a wrong conclusion on 
Plato’s understanding of evil.  
For humans, evils are not only needs themselves, but our awareness of these needs. Evil is a condition 
known as such, a condition that therefore might be otherwise. … In sum, evil is neediness of which we 
are aware, and good is that which we judge might answer to this condition of neediness.66  
The assertion that Plato took neediness of which we are aware as evil, is indeed difficult 
to defend. On the contrary, it seems that he never considered human neediness and even 
mortality as true evil, but only as symptoms of bodily condition and ignorance. This, I believe, 
has been amply proven already in the Apology and Crito (to say nothing of the Phaedo), where 
Socrates is depicted first as taking a heroic stand in the face of the greatest danger, and next as 
being not at all worried by his imminent death. Over and over again Socrates repeats that not 
death, but injustice and ignorance are to be feared. There is no need to picture Plato as some kind 
of existentialist thinker, whose awareness of human insufficiencies awakens in him either horror 
or resignation. As for Stern’s understanding of the good, it is enough to say that the attempt to 
define the good or goodness as in any way relative to the bad is utterly non-Platonic.  
 
3.6 Excursus: Phaedo 60b-c and the necessary coupling of pleasure and pain  
 
After these reflections on the purport of the phrase τὴν θνητὴν φύσιν, we can now dwell 
for a short while on the rest of the clause where it appears, i.e. on Plato’s assertion that the 
besetment with evils of the place where mortal creatures abide is a matter of necessity (τόνδε τὸν 
τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης). The opening of Socrates’ instructions to his companions in the 
Phaedo (60b-c), may serve as a useful illustration of what Plato intends to convey with this 
statement. On the morning of Socrates’ last day, after assembling near the prison and entering his 
cell, Phaedo and the others find him in the company of Xanthippe and their young child. Upon 
                                                          
65 For a much bolder thesis, claiming that all animals are inherently intelligent and thus capable of 
reordering the circles of the Same and the Different, see Carpenter, Amber D. „Embodying Intelligence: 
Animals and Us in Plato's Timaeus“. In Dillon, John and Zovko, Marie-Elise (eds.). Platonism and Forms 
of Intelligence (Berlin: Academie Verlag 2008), pp. 47ff.  
66 Stern 2002, p. 284 
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 her departure from the prison, Socrates takes hold of his leg which has recently been freed from 
the shackle, and rubbing it, starts to ponder over the strong bond between the affections of 
pleasure and pain, which he extends to the point of mutual dependency, almost a conjoining 
brought about by necessity. 
What a strange thing, my friends, said he, appears to be that which men call pleasant;67 how wonderfully 
it is disposed towards what is thought to be its opposite,68 the painful; while they are unwilling to come to 
the same man simultaneously, if somebody would pursue one and would seize it, he would almost always 
be forced to receive the other as well, as if they, although being two, have been joined by one tip of the 
head (60b3-c1) 
Socrates next highlights his claim by making a counterfactual appeal to traditional 
authority in composing fables:69 had this peculiar phenomenon caught the eye of Aesop, he 
would have certainly composed a fable (μῦθος),70 to the effect that the deity, after failing to 
                                                          
67 There are at least two reasons why the pleasant is qualified by the phrase ‘which men call (so)’. The 
first one, identified by Rowe, Christopher James. Plato: Phaedo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1993), p. 118f and Gallop, David. Plato: Phaedo, Translated with Notes (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975), 
p. 76 is that the pleasant spoken of here is no more than relief from pain. Gallop claims that, in Plato, this 
understanding of the pleasant could be extended to most of the pleasures human beings experience. Relief 
from pain, however, is not positively pleasurable, and consequently the pleasant is such only in the 
opinion of the ignorant, and not in real sense. The other would be that the bodily pleasures, even if 
granted the status of authentic experiences, are no more than illusion. In the words of the Timaeus, 
pleasure is “evil’s strongest lure” (69 d1), while in the Republic we read that pleasure is neither real nor 
pure, but deceptive (583 b3-5). Since it is also strongly dissociated from the goal of life, and thus the 
good (see Phd. 83b-e), it wouldn’t be unreasonable to say that it is pleasant only in the minds of the 
people in general, whom Plato is holding in no high regard.  
68 The status of pain is not brought into question. Those who claim to be in pain are holders of true belief 
regarding their experience (see Rep. 584e-a). However, it is questionable whether it is really the opposite 
of the so called pleasant; hence the formulation ‘what is thought to be its opposite’. That is curious. That 
pain and pleasure are opposites is stated in the Republic 583c2, and is in conformity with Aristotle’s 
definition of opposites. Pleasure and pain, as defined in Tim. 64d, are both intense disturbances, which 
respectively come upon and depart from the subject, and thus fit well into Aristotle’s definition. Rowe 
1993, p. 119 offers a simple solution: if the pleasant is not really such, then pain is not a true opposite of it 
either.      
69 That the Phrygian slave, Aesop, holds some kind of authority or is somehow revered by Socrates is 
obvious from the episode of him versifying one of his fables, as a matter of what he takes to be a sacred 
duty (see Phd. 61a-b).  
70 Among the vast literature on Plato’s inclination to wed myth and philosophy especially instructive are 
Brisson, Luc. Plato the Myth Maker (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press 1998), and Collobert, 
Catherine et al (eds.) [Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths (Leiden: Brill, 
2012). For analysis of the Aesopian myth in the Phaedo, see Betegh, Gabor. “Tale, Theology and 
Teleology in the Phaedo”. In Partenie, Catalin (ed.).  Plato’s Myths. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2009), who also makes some useful remarks on Plato’s myth in general. 
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 reconcile the two quarreling factions, joined their heads together, making it thus impossible for 
someone visited by the one not to be visited by the other as well. The purpose of this little myth 
is to provide some background information concerning the state of affairs antecedent to the 
present one, and to causally explain the arousal of the latter from the former.71 It thus serves as 
an allegory which illustrates the close connection between pleasure and pain, as well as the fact 
that even a divine power would be incapable of eliminating from this world the defective 
situation of being in pain.   
So, the allegory presents pleasure and pain as being in a state of war (πολεμοῦντα), and 
the deity as desirous to resolve the dispute. How could have the good god reconciled the warring 
parties? In which way could have he stopped the war? What would a reconciliation brought 
about by a good deity mean if not subjugation and marginalization of pain? However, since that 
was not possible, they were juxtaposed and bound together.  
Such an ordering is to be taken as the work of a benevolent god, and it is natural to ask 
how it reflects his goodness. Perhaps by at least allowing for some orderliness – pain and 
pleasure now follow a regular pattern, human beings are not constantly harassed by their 
incessant attacks and should be aware of what to expect and what not. Otherwise, pains are 
unavoidable; they are infesting mortal nature as a matter of necessity, and even a god cannot do 
anything about it. Through the intervention of the unidentified deity, the situation was improved, 
as far as that was possible, though the calamity was not altogether dispelled. Since the god of the 
Phaedo fable was unable to reconcile the dispute of the warring parties (by perhaps silencing or 
eliminating pain), he produced the present state of affairs, where their necessary connectedness is 
represented through the mythical picture of Siamese-twin animals. This could mean that at least 
physical suffering (which is ordinarily taken to be a bad thing) is inherent to the nature Socrates 
is about to depart from. The god wouldn’t allow it to prevail in the dispute and thus make 
existence on Earth unbearable, but even he is not capable of eliminating it entirely. This is, I 
believe, the moral that should be drawn from the Phaedo fable: despite the presence of divine 
will and its intention to introduce sound order and harmony of beauty and goodness in the 
                                                          
71 Betegh (op. cit., pp. 84f) identifies four stages in the development of mythical narrative in Plato: 1) 
positing some initial state of affairs that calls for rectification; 2) introduction of a (benevolent) deity 
willing to rectify the situation; 3) application of divine power, somewhat constrained by various ‘limiting 
conditions’, to the defective situation; 4) a functional description of the current state of affairs, for which 
the fable is meant to provide explanation. The Phaedo fable fits this paradigm nicely.  
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 cosmos, there are, as of yet unidentified, factors of inhibition of the creative process, which 
prevent the full realization of the divine plan.  
Still, the Phaedo account of the relation between pleasure and pain and the fable 
associated with it are far from being unproblematic, especially in light of the real-life example 
Socrates gives. Even if we disregard the questionable status of ‘the pleasant’ and the nature of its 
opposition with pain briefly commented on above, their inseparability remains “a curious moral 
for Socrates to draw from the state of his leg”.72 In what way exactly is the constant conjunction 
of pleasure and pain to be understood?  
A possible approach to the issue, as also noted by Burnet,73 could be the non-extravagant 
assumption, first put in writing by Heraclitus: “Illness made health pleasant and good, hunger – 
satiety, fatigue – rest” (DK B111).74 This outlook does fit well with Socrates’ example – the 
shackles used to cause him pain, but as soon as they were removed, pleasure ensued. Now, the 
state of someone’s limbs not being pressed hard by a metal device would not be normally 
considered as pleasurable. However, since in Socrates’ case it had been preceded by the opposite 
state, a painful one, it might be legitimate for him to say that he was feeling pleasure. In other 
words, had it not been for the antecedent pain, the state Socrates found himself could not have 
been described as pleasurable either. Thus it seems plausible to say that pleasure naturally ensues 
after pain.   
The reverse situation is more difficult to explain in light of the example. Should we 
suppose that the state of pleasure Socrates was in should be necessarily succeeded by a painful 
one? It shouldn’t be so – “[t]here is no likelihood that the pleasure he now feels in his leg will be 
followed by pain”.75 But couldn’t it be that the single example Socrates gives is not devised in 
such a way as to cover all the possible applications of the principle? He is there elucidating the 
alternation from pain to pleasure, and undoubtedly, he could have given an example of the 
                                                          
72 Gallop 1975, p. 77 
73 See his notes in Burnet, John. Plato’s Phaedo: Edited with Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1911), p. 14 
74 This ‘Heraclitean’ idea is not foreign to Plato either. He elaborates on it in Rep.583 c-d, but only to 
dismiss the cessation of undesirable states as true pleasure. It conforms well with and straightforwardly 
explains Plato’s reluctance to speak of the pleasant in the passage under discussion as pleasant in the real 
sense.   
75 Galop 1975, ibid. 
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 reverse. In fact, it is well known that pleasure can be followed immediately by pain – the delight 
of having a sumptuous meal is often exchanged for the pain of overeating. Even the most intense 
sensual enjoyment human beings experience often ends up in moroseness – post coitum omne 
animal triste. It could be objected, however, that it is not generally so – those of moderate 
appetite often avoid the pitfalls of dissatisfaction and pain. Still, maybe the very cessation of 
pleasurable sensation could be interpreted as a kind of pain. Plato actually vouches for the 
plausibility of this proposal: “And whenever someone ceases to rejoice in something, 
straightaway that quieting of pleasure will be painful to him” (Rep. 583e1).  
 
3.7 Back to the Theaetetus: alternative view on ἀνάγκη in 176a8   
 
There is one major shortcoming in the utilization of the Phaedo myth as an illustration of 
Plato’s point that mortal nature is beset with evils as a matter of necessity; it shifts the assumed 
focus of the Theaetetus Digression from evil as moral insufficiency to evil as physical suffering. 
But then again, although the predominant focus of the Digression is on the moral evil, the huge 
variety of inconveniences and suffering that human and non-human beings experience is by no 
means excluded from Plato’s account. According to the interpretation submitted in this paper, 
Plato first established the ontological basis for the existence of evils, which is the necessary 
presence of an entity or principle contrary to τὸ ἀγαθόν. Next, in the above quoted clause, he 
determines the precise locus of the evils – mortal nature and the earthly region. The evils spoken 
of are mainly vice and misinterpreted so-called virtues, but pain and decrepitude are also not to 
be overlooked. They include all injustice and suffering we undergo and perpetuate, the broad 
scope of varieties of badness that are associated with mortal nature, and of which there is no 
escape as long as one is bound to the lower spheres of existence. In the preceding clause, Plato 
used the word ἀνάγκη to impress upon his readers the point that it is not possible for the Good 
not to have an opposite (if the creation were to exist at all), and now (οὔτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ 
ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης), his overt purpose is to 
convey that this mortal region, inhabited by human and non-human animals, can never 
conceivably be free of vice and suffering. Already in the next few sentences, Plato also provides 
an outline of a possible solution to the problem of evil. This is a solution, to put it 
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 anachronistically, very much in the spirit of the Irenaean theodicies:76 the presence of evils in our 
world may be seen as an impetus for purifying ourselves and leaving this mortal region once and 
for all. So, the evils are here to make us aware of the necessity to flee from here as soon as 
possible. The flight is, of course, not accomplished by spatial dislocation, but by becoming as 
similar to god as it is possible (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν), which is a task attainable 
through moral and spiritual self-perfecting. Here, as well as in the account of the two paradigms 
and the afterlife (176d-177a), Plato is exhorting his readers not to give in to moral weakness and 
be transformed from men into wolves (Rep. 566a4) in this life, and lead perpetual future lives as 
“evil men associated with evils” (κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, Tht. 177a7). A developed human being 
should be able to make the right choice between good and bad, and the philosopher is there to 
help him or her make that choice. The presence of numerous evils, which Theodorus so bitterly 
regrets, serves as a reminder that the only alternative is lending one’s ear to the philosopher’s 
advice and working one’s way up to the realm of higher reality. Hence the usefulness and the 
‘soul making’ property of the internal and external badness, which almost everyone encounters 
on a daily basis.   
There is, however, yet another, and, indeed, a very tentative way to understand the 
second usage of the word ἀνάγκη, which this time appears in the phrase ἐξ ἀνάγκης. According 
to this understanding, Plato’s employment of the phrase ἐξ ἀνάγκης as referring to the presence 
of evils in the world, is actually a clear anticipation of the esoteric philosophy of the Timaeus, 
and confirmation, as well as elaboration, of the thesis that the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν is something 
else than the individual evils. The word ἀνάγκη is now used substantively – governed by the 
preposition ek, it may expresses origin or cause – so it means ‘of necessity’, ‘by necessity’, ‘due 
to necessity’, or ‘by means of necessity’. Plato’s obvious intention is to confirm once again the 
truism that it is unimaginable that this world could be free from vice and suffering – they are 
necessarily bound to the mortal nature and the material sphere. This necessity is, however, 
derivative from the first kind of necessity, i.e. the one that dictates the existence of the Good’s 
                                                          
76 The basic tenets of Irenaean type of theodicy are that a) humans are created as imperfect, immature 
creatures who need to undergo moral and spiritual growth which became known as ‘soul making’ 
process; b) hence the original fall is not an act of sin against God, but a childhood mistake due to 
ignorance; c) the purpose of the world is to facilitate human beings in developing perfect moral character, 
and the inclusion of evil and suffering is there to draw them closer to God.  For a succinct exposition of 
St. Irenaeus’ thought and his approach to the problem of evil, see Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan 2010), pp. 211ff.    
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 opposite. Τὸ ἀγαθόν of the Theaetetus, as understood in this text, stands at the top of the 
ontological scale. Wherever there is a top, there is necessarily a bottom as well. At the bottom 
the subordinate opposite is situated, which, being an opposite, has to be producing effects 
contrary to those produced by the Good, or in other words, has to be responsible for the bad 
things. In the first part of the passage on evil it was denoted simply as ὑπεναντίον τι, but in the 
second Plato uses the term which will gain great significance in the Timaeus – ἀνάγκη. Even in 
the Theaetetus 176a8, however fancifully and even outrageously Neo-Platonic it may sound, this 
is, linguistically, a rather legitimate reading of the ἐξ ἀνάγκης phrase – the evils are haunting this 
world due to Necessity.  
This is an understanding not unheard of among modern scholars. In his notes to Plato’s 
Laws 896d, where the soul is described as αἰτία παντῶν, both of τῶν ἀγαθῶν and τῶν κακῶν, 
England writes: “Here is introduced the question of the origin of evil,”77 only to dismiss the soul 
as the true cause of evil. He does that by calling attention to Timaeus 48a, where the πλανωμένη 
αἰτία, i.e. ἀνάγκη is, according to him, indicated as that which ‘produces evil in the world of 
bodily existence’. He finds the same ἀνάγκη in the Theaetetus passage on evil, which he quotes 
in full, and goes on to say: “Here, as in the Timaeus passage, ἀνάγκη is named as the source of 
evil. This idea, that evil is confined to bodily existence, and our earth, is in full agreement with 
all that is said about evil in the Laws.”78 So it seems that the further ‘esoteric twist’ in the 
Digression is not utterly improbable, and there could be a strong link between the rudiments of 
the theory of evil in the Theaetetus and its more developed form in the Timaeus.  
To sum up: my main purpose in this paper was to offer a more in-depth analysis of the 
passage on evil that appears, rather unexpectedly, in the not-less-striking Digression of the 
Theaetetus, obviously divergent from the general direction of the dialogue. An attempt was made 
to establish the following major points:  
First, that although not evident at a glance, Plato’s doctrine of the Forms is present in the 
Theaetetus Digression and that its presence does not cause any strain to the main argumentative 
flow of the dialogue.  
                                                          
77 England, Edwin Bourdieu (ed., tr.). The Laws of Plato. (Manchester: University Press 1921), p. 474 
78 Op. cit., p. 475 
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 Second, that the word ‘good’ at 176a6 refers to no less than Plato’s highest entity – αὐτὸ 
ἀγαθόν. The main strategy of providing rationale for this interpretation was a type of reductio 
argument: all the other candidates for taking that position were shown to be inadequate.  
Third, that τὰ κακά of 176a5 are not to be identified with the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν 
mentioned in the same line. Those evils are no more than instances of badness, be they moral 
deficiencies (which are specifically stressed in the Theaetetus Digression) or physical sufferings, 
and thus cannot stand as the opposite of τὸ ἀγαθόν. The latter is supposed to be a unified entity 
and the origin of all particular cases of goodness, and thus cannot have as its opposite particular 
cases of badness, which stand as contraries to the instances of the Good. 
Fourth, a proposal was submitted that the ὑπεναντίον of 176a6, the subordinated opposite 
of τὸ ἀγαθόν, and the second ἀνάγκη in the passage (176a8) could denote the same entity. In an 
attempt to envision the nature of the ὑπεναντίον, which, as it was argued, differs from τὰ κακά, 
an assumption was made that it could represent a possible early anticipation of the Timaean 
ἀνάγκη, the principle of imperfection.  
The Theaetetus passage on evil has thus been interpreted as setting the stage for a crucial 
doctrine which would be explicated in much greater detail in the Timaeus. Understood in this 
way, it assumes an anticipatory relation to Plato’s later thoughts on the subject, and thus proves 
to be of considerable interest for those inquiring into the Platonic cause of evil.79    
 
 
Viktor Ilievski 
University of Bucharest 
 
 
                                                          
79 This interpretation does not presuppose Unitarian reading of Plato. He could have had some basic ideas 
at the time when the Theaetetus was written, which were later subjected to a much more developed 
treatment; or, alternatively, he could have had an already ready-made doctrine of the causes of evil alone, 
which does not imply that Plato’s philosophy in general was not undergoing any modifications or passing 
through different phases of development.     
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